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Title: Manipulation by Merging and Annexation in Weighted Voting Games
Authors: Slavov, Zdravko
Evans, Christina
Keywords: Weighted Voting Game
Banzhaf Index
Issue Date: 2017
Publisher: Institute of Mathematics and Informatics Bulgarian Academy of Sciences
Citation: Serdica Journal of Computing, Vol. 11, No 1, (2017), 059p-072p
Abstract: The problem of manipulation in voting is fundamental and has received attention in recent research in game theory. In this paper, we consider two cases of manipulation in weighted voting games done by merging of coalitions into single players and by annexation of a part or all of the voting weights of another player viewed from two perspectives: of the effect of swings of players and of the role of the Banzhaf power index. We prove two theorems for manipulation by merging and annexation, and show several attractive properties in these two processes. ACM Computing Classification System (1998): J.4, I.2.1.
ISSN: 1312-6555
Appears in Collections:Volume 11 Number 1

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